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NULLUMI TEMIPUS OCCURRIT REGI.
THE

English common-law rule, that the limitation will not run

against the king, has been adopted in every one of the United
States, and nullum tempus occurritreipublice, is now firmly estab-

lished law here. For example, a natural person may be prosecuted and punished for crime at any time whatever after the
alleged perpetration of the offence; and an action may be maintained, and judgment rendered against any person for the delivery
of possession of land wrongfully held, at any time whatever, unless
after twenty-one years from the time that the government ceased
to be the owner. Such action and judgment may be bad by any
grantee of the government. Such is the well-settled general common-law rule. But, like every other general rule, it has its exceptions, which are said to strengthen the general rule.
Where the legislature has by voluntary statutory enactment
limited the time within which prosecutions for crime may be commenced, we see an exception to the first-mentioned branch of the
rule. And it is believed that where the government has parted
with the equitable title, we have an exception to the second stated
branch of the rule, at least in the United States.
A natural person may here acquire an equitable title to a tract
of the public land, in several ways, three of which are very familiar, and of course what the person gets the former possessor loses.
For what one has, with a right, none other can have with a right,
at the same time.
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First: A person who has made a lawful entry and survey on any
of the public domain set apart as bounty land for soldiers, upon a
military warrant valid in his favor, thereby acquires an equitable
title to such survey, has a right to the possession, and to a conveyance from the government.
Second: An equitable title is acquired by entry of public lands:
viz., by the person who purchases and pays for a tract of Congress
Land (so called), at the proper Land Office.
And Third: Possession taken and maintained under any of the
Pre-emption Acts of Congress, and the payment of the price required by such act, and at the time required, vests an equitable
title in the pre-emptor. Locators under treaty stipulations also
acquire such equities.
And all these titles are assignable, and good in the hands of the
assignee. • And in all of these cases the government certainly holds
the legal title in trust for the use of the first equitable owner and
his assigns.
To discuss and support this second-mentioned exception to the
rule nullum tempus-to show that unless saved by disability, the
limitation should begin to run in favor of the occupant immediately
when the equitable title has passed from the government to the
citizen, is the object of this writing. This can be done, it is believed, upon principle, and upon authority.
First: It is consistent with the practical workings of our coinplicated and compound system of combined State and Federal authority: viz., in the matter of the taxation of such lands by state
legislation. The power to tax would be nugatory without the
power to disseise the delinquent who refuses to pay the assessment. AnA if the general rule is to be enforced without the exception the delinquent may, fifty years or even more after the tax
sale, sue out a patent and recover the land from the tax purchaser.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, after full argument and mature
consideration, have adjudged that a tax sale made in compliance
with statute vests the tax purchaser with a title in'fee: Uwynne
v. Niswanger, 20 Ohio 556. This decision, as far as the writer
has been able to learn, has never been overruled or even controverted by any court, either state or national. It seems, however,
to go further than necessary, and further than warranted by a reasonable application of the principles of law. Would it not have
beensufficient to hold the general government, before patent, and
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her grantees after, to be seised of the legal title in trust for the use
of the tax purchaser, who had got the interest of the delinquent?
It is immaterial, however, whether the tax sale carries a title in
fee, or whether it be merely evidence of the passage of the equitable title from the delinquent, to the purchaser. In either case
the rule nullum temrpus is curtailed, and the exception sustained.
In the newer states this power to tax has been recognised and
'limited by express Act of Congress (3d U. S. Stats. at Large
291, 349, 443, 492, 549) ; and in the older states either reserved
or used as a matter of course.
By the Virginia Deed of Cession the United States held the
military district in Ohio in trust for tie use of Virginia soldiers
entitled to bounty land, and Ohio did tax located tracts thereof
before patent.
Second: The reason upon which the general rule rests being
absent in the cases mentioned, of owners of unpatented lands, the
rule itself should be relaxed and the exception prevail. Because
the king cannot be present in every place at the same time, and
should not suffer loss or injury in his lands by reason of the negligence or unfaithfulness of his agents; therefore no lapse of time
of adverse possession can be permitted to injure him. Where the
king would not be in danger of loss, the reason being wanting the
rule should not be applied. Now 'should the crown part with the
equitable title to a piece of land, retaining nothing therein, but
only the bare, naked, legal title, it would lose nothing by any
number of assignments of equities therein, nor by any number of
changes of possession thereof. And the limitation should be made
to run as between subjects.
Perhaps there is no instance of equitable title emanating from
the crown and resting in the subject; but as we have seen, the
thing is almost universal here; and as the government has in every
instance received the value of the land: by military services ; by
pre-emptors' settlement of wild districts; by money; by treaty reciprocities and the like, it has nothing, in the premises to lose, and
may well hold legal title in trust for the use of the occupant with
right. So that the statutes of rest should begin to run as soon as
the government has received consideration for the land in any of
the ways mentioned, for the beneficial ownership has passed to
some person, and the limitation is only a means of judicially knowing to whom.
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This suggests the remark: That when twenty-one years' adverse
possession of patented lands raises the conclusive presumption of
a grant, a fortiori the same length of time with the same kind of
possession, should, and does, justify the same presumption of an
assignment of the equitable right. The reason for the latter being
str.nger in this: That conveyances are executed with solemnity
and in form, and mostly with attestation, magisterial acknowledgment and record : while assignments need rio solemnities, require no witnesses, no form, no record; and indeed, in some of the
states may be in parol, if with possession. So that as a matter of
reasonable presumption of fact, the assignment should rather be
presumed to have been made and lost, than that a deed was made
and lost, as in the case of the patented lands.
It will scarcely be claimed that possible reversion to the government, in case the person who first acquired from it the equity with
all his heirs and representatives, should be lost, should be insisted
on at the expense of an occupant who has no means of proving
his assigneeship excepting the presumption founded upon the lapse
of time. The continued enforcement of the rule under consideration, without the exception, substantially tenders a premium on
fraudulent negligence.
For instance: A. acquires an equitable title to a tract of land,
in any one of the ways mentioned above, takes out no patent,
neglects to pay taxes, and the land goes into the possession of a
tax purchaser. Or A. sells the land by written contract and receives payment. Or indeed sells the land by contract in parol with
.payment and possession, which in some of the states takes the contract out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds. Now A. has
no substantial interest in suing out a patent, and he neglects to do
so, or he may fraudulently and purposely abstain from doing it;
nor can the occupant do so, without the proper documentary evidence, which is in A's. posssesion, and he is absent, and it is neglected by the purchasing occupant in ignorance and in good
faith, until after the lapse of fifty or a hundred years, the land
having in the mean time become very valuable by the general
growth of the country, and especially by the labor and money of the
occupant. And after the written title bond has been long lost,
after the witnesses of the contract in parol have been long dead,
after the record of the tax sale has gone where all waste paper
goes: A. or his heirs sue out a patent, for they never, necessarily,
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parted with the evidence of their right to have conveyance: file
declaration in a court of law in ejectment, and of course recover.
And nothing is left to the real owner of the land, but to pay
costs and counsel fees and take the poor compensation to which he
is entitled under the occupying claimant statute and leave his home
for ever. Such burlesques upon the administration of justice should
not be permitted.
True, the courts of law in the United States have very often
affirmed the doctrine that the limitation cannot be pleaded in an
action of ejcctment unless the land had been granted by patent, to
some person more than twenty-one years before the commencement
of the action : For the reason that a grant to the occupant cannot
be presumed (against the possibility) he could have no conveyance
from the government, else it would be seen of record, nor could he
by any possibility have had a conveyance from any other person,
for rio other person had the legal title to give. But on the other
hand the courts of equity have just as often decreed the holder of
the legal title to be a trustee for the use of the equitable owner.
And that too on equitable assignments made long before issue of
patent: .Duke v. Thompson, 16 Ohio 34. So after all there is
nothing left but a question of evidence going to the issue; assignment or not? And. as has already been suggested, it is more
reasonable to take lapse of time as evidence of an assignment of
equitable title, than to take lapse of time as evidence of legal
title by (Ieed. If the latter has always been done, where the
possibility was not excluded, why shall not the former, also be
done, unless possibility be excluded? And surely the retention of
the legal title by the United States, does not bar the possibility
of an assignment by title bond, by contract, by purchaser at tax
sale, or the like. No other rule of the common law need be suspended. Nor need any rule of practice be infringed to give effect
to the exception under consideration. Take for example: Plaintiff in ejectment will rest his cause upon a patent issued to him,
and datcd only one year ago. Defendant has been in adverse,
open, peaceable and continuous possession for forty years, under
purchase at forfeited tax sale. But by the death of persons and
the loss of papers he is unable to prove a strict compliance with
the tax statutes. So lie cannot plead the general issue. Norcan
he plead the limitation, for technically the plaintiff's cause of
action did not accrue until issue of patent. Judgment at law
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must be for plaintiff.

But defendant will exhibit his bill in chan-

cery showing the facts, and obtain a provisional injunction restraining the original plaintiff from enforcing his judgment at law.
Then if the bill be traversed and supported by the evidence, the
chancellor will make the injunction perpetual and decree a conveyance from the patentee to the occupant, on the ground that
the former is trustee for the use of the latter. The same on demurrer to bill. And in Ohio, and other states, where the courts
are supposed to possess law and chancery jurisdiction so combined
as that the one or the other may be administered as the facts of
each particular case may require, whether these facts be exhibited
by the plaintiff or by the defendant, there need only be the petition showing that the plaintiff is the owner of the land, and has
a right to the immediate possession thereof, and that the defendant keeps him out; and answer denying plaintiff's ownership
and right of possession, and setting up defendants' tax purchase
and possession ; and reply denying the tax purchase, or general
demurrer to answer. These alleged facts call for the exercise of
the chancery powers of the court, for the patentee may be a trustee
of the legal title. If the court find the possession as alleged, the
lapse of time will raise the conclusive legal presumption, not of
grant, but of assignment of the equitable title to defendant, from
the state to which the land was forfeited for non-payment of taxes,
or directly from the plaintiff or from his ancestors; and judgment
will be for defendant that he recover his costs, and decree that
plaintiff convey to 'him.
It may be objected that since the government cannot be sued,
unless by special enabling statute, which does not exist, that no
good could result from the enforcement of the exception ; no decree could operate against the United States, nor give the occupant
the legal title.
To this it may be answered : The substantial enjoyment of the
possession is not diminished by the want of the legal title ; and
a special act might be passed authorizing the occupant to make
the United States party defendant in chancery; or, which would
be better, Congress might and should by statute authorize and
require the commissioner of the general land-office to issue patents
to such occupants upon documentary evidence filed in the Department of the Interior, showing the original equitable title to be
more than twenty-one years old, and showing the necessary ad-

